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FORTY-EIGHT STATES ARE PROBABLY NOT 
WRONG: AN ARGUMENT FOR MODERNIZING 
GEORGIA’S LEGAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
Ben Rosichan* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, a Texas couple hired Chilton Maverick, a family friend, to 
draft their divorce settlement agreement.1 At the husband’s request, 
Mr. Maverick convinced the wife, Ms. Willis, to delete a provision 
allowing her to live in their marital home until their child turned 
eighteen by misinforming her that she would still have to consent if 
the husband ever tried to sell the home.2 Ms. Willis sued Mr. 
Maverick for legal malpractice in 1981 after her ex-husband sold the 
home without her consent.3 A Texas jury found Mr. Maverick’s 
behavior reprehensible enough to award her $26,568.44 in 
compensatory damages and $610,000 in punitive damages.4 Mr. 
Maverick successfully moved for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict by persuading the trial court that the statute of limitations had 
run.5 The Texas Supreme Court found the facts of the case 
compelling enough, in conjunction with the “relationship of trust and 
confidence”6 between attorney and client, to reverse the trial court 
                                                                                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, 2017, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank Lia, Matt, and the 
rest of my family for supporting me through this process and throughout school. I would also like to 
thank Professor Sobelson for your advice, and Douglas Chandler and Bret Moore for giving me my first 
opportunity to do real legal work during my first summer and the idea for this note. Finally, I would be 
remiss if I did not thank all of the amazing mentors that helped me transition from my previous career to 
this wonderful profession, including Judge Totenberg and her clerks, Judge Goger and Lynette Jimenez, 
and everybody at Barnes Law Group. 
 1. Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. 1988). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 643–44. 
 4. Id. at 643. 
 5. Id. At the time, Texas had a two-year statute of limitations for “injury to the estate or to the 
property of another, conversion of personal property, taking or detaining the personal property of 
another, personal injury, forcible entry and detainer, and forcible detainer not later than two years after 
the day the cause of action accrues.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (1985). 
 6. McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). In this case, the Texas Court 
of Civil Appeals held that in legal malpractice, like any action in tort, “a cause of action . . . accrues 
1
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and adopt the discovery rule for legal malpractice actions in Texas.7 
As the Texas Supreme Court defined the discovery rule in this case, 
the statute of limitations runs from the date the plaintiff discovers or 
should have discovered “the nature of the injury.”8 
In Willis, the Texas Supreme Court also noted that “an ever 
increasing majority of states have recognized the inherent unfairness 
of commencing the statute of limitations in legal malpractice causes 
of action on the date of the occurrence of the negligent act or 
omission . . . .”9 Georgia and Arkansas are the last two states that 
have declined to join the vast majority of states in modifying their 
statutes of limitations for legal malpractice.10 Both states still adhere 
to the occurrence rule, where the statute of limitations begins to 
                                                                                                                 
when the tort is completed, that is, the act committed and damage suffered.” Id. at 646 (citing Atkins v. 
Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967)). Although the Court of Civil Appeals declared legal malpractice 
a tort similar to medical malpractice, it declined to adopt the discovery doctrine in that case. Id. at 646–
47. 
 7. Willis, 760 SW.2d at 645 (justifying adoption, in part, by noting “[t]he policy reasons relied upon 
by Texas courts in adopting the discovery rule in actions for fraud, credit libel, and medical malpractice 
are no less compelling in legal malpractice actions”). Part II, infra, discusses the definition and 
implications of the discovery rule in greater depth. 
  The discovery rule first surfaced for medical malpractice actions. Ohio, for example, addressed 
the statute of limitations for medical malpractice in a 1919 case, in which it held “that in an action for 
breach of contract [based on medical malpractice] the statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
the contract relation has been terminated.” Bowers v. Santee, 124 N.E. 238, 240 (Ohio 1919). Four years 
later, the Ohio Court of Appeals applied Bowers to a legal malpractice case, discussed the discovery 
rule, and held that Bowers applied to legal malpractice in addition to medical malpractice. McWilliams 
v. Hackett, 19 Ohio App. 416, 418–20 (1923). 
 8. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 644. 
 9. Id. at 646. 
 10. O.C.G.A § 9-3-25 (1962); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105(3) (1947) (granting a three-year statute 
of limitations for “[a]ll actions founded on any contract or liability, express or implied”). In Goldsby v. 
Fairley, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that almost every other state had moved away from the 
occurrence rule. 831 S.W.2d 142, 143 (Ark. 1992). The court also seemed to invite and encourage 
legislative action by stating: 
While this court has noted that other jurisdictions use different approaches in 
determining when the cause of action accrues, we have stated that if such a 
marked change is to be made in the interpretation of statutes that have long been 
the law, it should be done prospectively by the legislature and not retrospectively 
by the courts. 
Id. The Arkansas Court of Appeals reiterated the three-year statute of limitations from the date of the 
negligent act with language from a 1991 Arkansas Supreme Court decision claiming that the occurrence 
rule has a “countervailing fairness to it,” as the discovery rule could make professionals liable “25 to 30 
years after the [negligent act].” Rice v. Ragsdale, 292 S.W.3d 856, 861 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 
Chapman v. Alexander, 817 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Ark. 1991)). In Rice, the Arkansas Court of Appeals also 
noted that Arkansas’s history of rejecting the discovery rule dates back to at least 1877. Id.; see also 
White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 281, 291 (1877). 
2
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accrue on the date the negligent act or omission occurs.11 Most states 
have recognized the inherent pitfalls of a legal malpractice statute of 
limitations similar to Georgia’s and have adjusted their laws 
accordingly.12 The vast majority of attorneys do not resort to trickery 
like Chilton Maverick, but one case like that is one too many. Cases 
like Willis portray the profession in a negative light, even if they are 
rare. If and when a case like Willis surfaces in Georgia, the courts 
should be ready to protect the interests of the clients and the legal 
profession with a fair statute of limitations. 
Georgia has not had the kind of incendiary legal malpractice case 
that compels legislative or judicial action regarding the legal 
malpractice statute of limitations. The Georgia courts have, however, 
addressed inequities in the state’s medical malpractice statute of 
limitations in a series of cases in the 1980s.13 In one of the most 
important cases of that series, Clark v. Singer, the Georgia Supreme 
Court criticized statutes of limitation that expire before the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Minn. 2006) (“[Under] the traditional ‘occurrence’ 
rule, . . . the statute of limitations begins to run simultaneously with the performance of the negligent or 
wrongful act. . . . Most jurisdictions have moved away from the occurrence rule.”) The Minnesota 
Supreme Court went on to reject the occurrence rule because of the potential to encourage “wasteful 
economic behavior” by attorneys and clients. Id. 
 12. See generally FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: THE LAW OF LAWYERS’ 
LIABILITY (Merri A. Baldwin, Scott F. Bertschi & Dylan C. Black eds., 2012) [hereinafter FIFTY-STATE 
SURVEY]. This book gives a state-by-state survey of legal malpractice: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have all 
adopted some form of the discovery rule. Id. The District of Columbia, Idaho, Minnesota, and Missouri 
adhere to the damage rule. Id. Connecticut, Nebraska, New York, and South Dakota use the occurrence 
rule modified by the continuous representation rule. Id. Arkansas and Georgia cling to the occurrence 
rule. Id. Kansas has declined to choose a rule. Id. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has recognized four possible theories for determining 
when a legal malpractice action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to 
run: (1) The occurrence rule . . . (2) The damage rule . . . (3) The discovery 
rule . . . (4) The continuous representation rule . . . . In Dearborn Animal Clinic, 
the Kansas Supreme Court affirmatively declined to adopt any one of these 
theories to the exclusion of the others. 
W. Perry Brandt, State of Kansas, in FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra, at 178–79; see also Dearborn 
Animal Clinic, P.A. v. Wilson, 806 P.2d 997, 1003 (Kan. 1991). For a discussion of the continuing 
representation rule, see Part II.B, infra. For a discussion of the damage rule, see Part II.C, infra. 
 13. See, e.g., Allrid v. Emory Univ., 285 S.E.2d 521, 524 (Ga. 1982); Clark v. Singer, 298 S.E.2d 
484, 486 (Ga. 1983); see also C. Frederick Overby, Jason Crawford & Teresa T. Abell, Trial Practice 
and Procedure, 50 MERCER L. REV. 359, 369 (1998) [hereinafter Trial Practice and Procedure]. 
3
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even knows of the malpractice.14 That series of cases recognized the 
special relationship of trust between doctor and patient, and sought to 
strike a balance between the interests of the negligent doctor and the 
wronged patient.15 Although legal malpractice does not have life-or-
death consequences like medical malpractice, the economic and 
emotional harm many legal malpractice victims suffer is life-
altering.16 Clients may not place their physical health and safety in 
their attorneys’ hands, but they hire attorneys to advocate for their 
rights, redress wrongs against them, and protect their pecuniary 
interests.17 
Clients lose time, money, and peace of mind, when they suffer 
from attorney negligence because the person they hired to protect 
their rights violated them.18 The legal profession is largely self-
regulated, and each state has a bar association charged with creating 
and enforcing basic standards of professionalism and competence for 
attorneys.19 Unfortunately, attorneys do not always adhere to these 
standards.20 In Georgia, the State Bar can address attorney 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Clark, 298 S.E.2d at 486 (“To impose a limitation period which may be exhausted before the 
cause of action accrues (i.e., before the patient dies), arbitrarily distinguishes between wrongful death, 
medical malpractice plaintiffs.”). 
 15. Trial Practice and Procedure, supra note 13, at 369–70. 
 16. See, e.g., Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 642 (Tex. 1988). In that case, Chilton Maverick’s 
negligent act left Ms. Willis without a home. Id.; see also Sherry L. Talton, $100 Million Legal 
Malpractice Verdict Provides Lessons for Litigators, AM. BAR ASS’N: LITIG. NEWS (March 10, 2011), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/031011-ethics-malpractice-multiple-
clients.html (discussing a Mississippi jury’s award of $100 million in damages against a law firm that 
represented both parties in a dispute); Verdicts and Settlements, BLAND RICHTER, 
http://www.blandrichter.com/verdicts-and-settlements2.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter 
BLAND RICHTER] (describing how an incorrect patent opinion led to the assessment of $5,508,000 
against a negligent attorney). 
 17. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2001). 
 18. See Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 642. 
 19. See, e.g., GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-102 (2001). In Georgia, for example, the State 
Bar promulgates the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. It enforces these rules through an administrative 
process where the Bar has powers up to and including disbarment. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., In re Minsk, 765 S.E.2d 361, 362 (Ga. 2014) (disbarring a bankruptcy attorney for 
filing a bankruptcy petition on behalf of a client without consent and with forged signatures, making 
false statements to the client, and making errors in judgment that led to the client being held in 
contempt); In re Green, 622 S.E.2d 332, 333–34 (Ga. 2005) (disbarring an attorney for accepting 
retainers from clients and then abandoning them); In re Kendall, 585 S.E.2d 882, 882–83 (Ga. 2003) 
(disbarring a criminal defense attorney for giving his client notice of impending search and seizure 
warrants); In re Barrett, 577 S.E.2d 771, 771–72 (Ga. 2003) (disbarring an attorney who was convicted 
of three counts of grand theft and one charge of carrying a concealed firearm in Florida); In re 
4
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misconduct through remedial measures up to and including 
disbarment.21 The State Bar cannot, however, compensate wronged 
clients through monetary damages.22 Thus, some wronged clients 
must resort to a lawsuit for legal malpractice where a financial 
recovery is necessary to make the client whole again. 
The common law in Georgia provides a cause of action for 
malpractice against the negligent attorney. To prevail, a plaintiff 
must prove: (1) he employed an attorney; (2) the attorney failed to 
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence; and (3) the attorney’s 
negligence proximately caused damage to the client.23 Additionally, 
the plaintiff must prove that the underlying case would have been 
successful, but for the attorney’s negligence.24 To win a legal 
malpractice lawsuit, the plaintiff must win two cases: the primary 
case that the attorney should have won, and the secondary negligence 
case against the alleged mal-practitioner.25 By setting the time frame 
in which the plaintiff must bring a claim or face having it barred, the 
statute of limitations is one of the most basic procedural hurdles that 
a plaintiff must clear when bringing a legal malpractice suit.26 
                                                                                                                 
McFarland, 573 S.E.2d 56, 58 (Ga. 2002) (disbarring an attorney for converting a client’s property); In 
re Threlkeld, 539 S.E.2d 823, 824 (Ga. 2001) (disbarring a criminal defense attorney for massaging his 
17-year-old client’s genitals during a consultation in a juvenile detention facility); In re Tante, 453 
S.E.2d 688, 689–90 (Ga. 1994) (suspending a male attorney for representing a married woman whose 
medical records indicated emotional and mental vulnerability and using that information to induce the 
client into an affair with him); In re Osborne, 442 S.E.2d 743, 744 (Ga. 1994) (disbarring an attorney for 
accepting retainers from three clients then doing no work at all on their cases). 
 21. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-102 (2001). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga. 1995). 
 24. Ross v. Edwards, 560 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (“[The plaintiff] must show that, but 
for [the attorney’s] negligence, he would have won a plaintiff’s verdict on the nuisance claim and would 
have received an award of damages.”). The concept of the “case within the case” is well articulated by 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court: 
To establish causation and injury in a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff is 
often compelled to prove the equivalent of two cases in a single proceeding or 
what has been referred to as a “suit within a suit.” This entails establishing that, 
“but for the negligence of the attorney, the client would have been successful in 
the prosecution or defense of an action.” 
Cook v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 509 N.W.2d 100, 104–5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Glamann v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins., 424 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Wis. 1988)). 
 25. Cont’l Cas. Co., 509 N.W.2d at 104–5. 
 26. See Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Statutes of limitations 
provide predictability and certainty as to the life-span of a cause of action. Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 510 
N.W.2d 900, 905 (Mich. 1994) (“The statute of limitations affords the opposing party a fair opportunity 
5
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The statute of limitations that Georgia has adopted for legal 
malpractice actions is fraught with pitfalls.27 Usually, the negligent 
attorney discovers the error or omission before the client does.28 
Most attorneys will fulfill the duty imposed by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct to inform clients of errors or omissions, but this 
does not always happen.29 The attorney may hope to fix the mistake 
before the client suffers any harm.30 The attorney also has a better 
understanding of the statute of limitations for legal malpractice and 
knows that damages do not accrue until the underlying case is finally 
adjudicated.31 Attorneys also know that without damages, no claim 
exists.32 Thus, attorneys in this position have an incentive to drag 
cases out beyond the four-year statute of limitations so that no 
                                                                                                                 
to defend, relieves the court system from dealing with ‘stale’ claims, and protects potential defendants 
from protracted fear of litigation.”). When the statute of limitations has run, “the plaintiff’s cause of 
action [is] dead. It [can]not be revived . . . .” Varricchio v. Johnson, 372 S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1988). In general, and subject to exceptions discussed in Part II, infra, Georgia courts set the statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice actions arising under contractual obligations imposed by incomplete 
written and oral agreements at four years, as governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, and running from the date 
of the alleged negligence. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411, 412 (Ga. 
1998) (“Under normal circumstances, the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions runs from 
the date of the alleged incident of malpractice.”); Duke Galish, L.L.C. v. Arnall Golden Gregory, L.L.P., 
653 S.E.2d 791, 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (“The cause of action ‘arises immediately upon the wrongful 
act having been committed.’” (quoting Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue v. Am. Envirecycle, Inc., 456 
S.E.2d 264, 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995))). 
 27. For a discussion of the negative consequences of the Occurrence Rule, see infra Part II.A. 
 28. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 428 (Cal. 1971) (“[T]he 
client may not recognize the negligence of the professional when he sees it. He cannot be expected to 
know the relative medical merits of alternative anesthetics, nor the various legal exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. If he must ascertain malpractice at the moment of its incidence, the client must hire a 
second professional to observe the work of the first . . . .”). 
 29. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2001) (imposing a duty to “promptly inform the client 
of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required” and 
to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter”); GA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (“A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant 
risk that the lawyer’s own interests . . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of the 
client” unless the client gives informed consent to continued representation.). 
 30. See DOLORES DORSAINVIL, DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND & JOHN C. BONNIE, MY BAD: CREATING A 
CULTURE OF OWNING UP TO LAWYER MISSTEPS AND RESISTING THE TEMPTATION TO BURY 
PROFESSIONAL ERROR 8 (2016). 
 31. Mauldin v. Weinstock, 411 S.E.2d 370, 373 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). 
 32. Szurovy v. Olderman, 530 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“Because [plaintiff in a legal 
malpractice action] failed to show that she could have negotiated a better agreement or that she would 
have obtained better results at trial, she has failed to establish damages and proximate cause.”). 
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damages have actually arisen or at least become apparent until the 
cause of action has expired.33 
The statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims should not 
be so restrictive that good claims are tossed out with the bad ones.34 
Nor should it facilitate dishonest, self-protective strategies by 
attorneys after they make a mistake.35 Part I of this Note explains 
Georgia’s legal malpractice statute of limitations, the occurrence 
rule.36 Part II analyzes the potential pitfalls of Georgia’s continued 
use of an unaltered occurrence rule,37 and examines the statutes of 
limitations that other states have adopted to address those pitfalls.38 
Part III proposes a new legal malpractice statute of limitations for 
Georgia, designed to better protect clients from attorney malfeasance 
without contravening general principles of Georgia jurisprudence.39 
I. BACKGROUND 
Georgia and Arkansas are the last states clinging to an unaltered 
occurrence rule for legal malpractice claims.40 In Georgia and 
Arkansas, the statute of limitations runs from the attorney’s negligent 
act—in Georgia it runs four years from the date of the negligent act.41 
Most states that use the occurrence rule have also adopted the 
“continuous representation rule.”42 The continuous representation 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue v. Am. Envirecycle, Inc., 456 S.E.2d 264, 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1995) (discussing the role of damages in a legal malpractice claim); Barnes v. Turner, 593 S.E.2d 9, 10 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 606 S.E.2d 849 (Ga. 2004) (analyzing and rejecting 
plaintiff’s contention that he could not have sued within the statute of limitations, because he did not 
suffer damage until after the statute of limitations has ran). 
 34. See Wendy Cox Dvorak, Casenote and Comment, Idaho’s Statute of Limitations and Accrual of 
Legal Malpractice Causes of Action: Sorry, but Your Case Was over Before It Began 31 IDAHO L. REV. 
231, 231–32 (1994). 
 35. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 428 (Cal. 1971). 
 36. See infra Part I. 
 37. See infra Part II.A. 
 38. See infra Part II.B–D. 
 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. For a discussion of Arkansas’ adherence to the occurrence rule, see supra note 10. 
 41. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411, 412 (Ga. 1998). 
 42. Rosenfield v. Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle, L.L.C., 795 A.2d 572, 581 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2002) (expressly adopting the continuous representation rule in Connecticut after a period of 
uncertainty as to whether or not the state had adopted it); Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 750 N.E.2d 67, 72–73 
(N.Y. 2001) (applying the continuous representation rule to toll the statute of limitations in a legal 
malpractice case); see also Larochelle v. Hodsdon, 690 A.2d 986, 988 (Me. 1997); Greene v. Morgan, 
7
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rule protects clients in an ongoing relationship with the negligent 
attorney by tolling the statute of limitations while the attorney and 
client are in a “continuous and ongoing relationship.”43 In contrast, 
many states use some form of the “discovery rule.”44 Under the 
discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins accruing from the 
time the client knew or reasonably should have known of the 
negligent act.45 Other states toll the statute of limitations until actual 
damages accrue.46 Even outside of these rules and their 
modifications, some states have adopted different time frames for 
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.47 
                                                                                                                 
Theeler, Cogley & Petersen, 575 N.W.2d 457, 460 (S.D. 1998); Shipman v. Kruck, 593 S.E.2d 319, 324 
(Va. 2004). 
 43. Barnes v. Turner, 606 S.E.2d 849, 852 (Ga. 2004) (both defining and rejecting the rule); cf. 
Shipman, 593 S.E.2d at 324–25 (contending that the continuous representation rule takes into account 
“the special trust and confidence inherent in the attorney-client relationship,” and determining that, 
under the rule, “[t]he date the alleged negligent attorney’s representation of the client terminates is the 
relevant date which commences the running of the statute of limitations”). 
 44. See generally FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12. For a discussion of each state’s rule for legal 
malpractice statutes of limitations, see supra note 12. 
 45. Epstein v. Brown, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (S.C. 2005). Epstein provides a good example in a 
neighboring jurisdiction. The South Carolina Supreme Court explained the policy reasons behind South 
Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations that begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of the negligent act. Id. That decision also expressly rejected the continuous representation rule 
in South Carolina. Id. 
 46. Mental Health Assocs., Inc. v. Carlson, 835 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Missouri’s 
statute of limitations is five years and does not begin to run until damage is sustained. Id. In this case, 
the client did not sustain damage from the attorney’s malpractice until a judgment was rendered against 
her and she had to sell her property. Id.; see also Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335–36 (Minn. 
2006) (“Minnesota has taken the middle ground [between the occurrence rule and discovery rule] by 
adopting the ‘damage’ rule of accrual, under which the cause of action accrues and the statute of 
limitations begins to run when ‘some’ damage has occurred as a result of the alleged 
malpractice. . . . [T]he rule that is the most logical and consistent with our precedent is that a cause of 
action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the occurrence of any compensable 
damage, whether specifically identified in the complaint or not.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Hooper v. Lewis, 477 N.W.2d 114, 115 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“A legal malpractice 
claim must be brought within two years of the date the attorney discontinues serving the client or within 
six months after the client discovers or should have discovered the claim, whichever is later.”). 
Michigan’s legal malpractice statute of limitations appears to be either the continuous representation 
rule or the discovery rule. Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical 
Analysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REV. 209, 231 (1986). Alabama’s statute of limitations 
also appears to be a hybrid. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-574 (1988). The statute is specific to legal malpractice. 
Id. The statute requires the plaintiff to bring suit “within two years after the act or omission or failure 
giving rise to the claim,” but qualifies that requirement for “cause[s] of action . . . not discovered and 
could not reasonably have been discovered within such period,” granting the discovery rule in those 
cases. Id. Finally, the statute imposes an absolute four-year statute of repose. Id. 
8
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The elements of legal malpractice in Georgia are well-settled.48 
Before considering the merits of each element of the claim, the 
plaintiff must find an expert willing to testify as to how the defendant 
attorney fell below the standard of care.49 For over a century, Georgia 
observed an unqualified, unaltered occurrence rule with a four-year 
statute of limitations accruing from the time of the negligent act.50 
Georgia treats legal malpractice as an action arising from a 
contract—albeit an incomplete contract—as opposed to other states, 
which treat it as an action in tort.51 
One dispute in particular, Newell Recycling v. Jordan Jones & 
Goulding, arising from a contract between an engineering firm and a 
recycling company, illustrates the difficulties in determining the 
applicable statute of limitations in professional liability actions.52 
Newell Recycling, Inc. (Newell) hired Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc. 
(JJ&G) to provide professional engineering assistance for 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga. 1995). 
 49. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2007). The plaintiff has to “file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert 
competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission 
claimed to exist and the factual basis for each claim.” Id. There is, however, an exception for “clear and 
palpable” negligence that a jury does not need an expert to understand. Hopkinson v. Labovitz, 499 
S.E.2d 338, 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). The stated policy behind the affidavit requirement is to reduce the 
number of frivolous lawsuits. Hous. Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 383 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Ga. 1989). In 
2010, legal malpractice plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of § 9-11-9.1, contending that it 
“prohibits indigent plaintiffs from pursuing their actions for professional negligence due to the costs of 
procuring an expert affidavit.” Walker v. Cromartie, 696 S.E.2d 654, 656 (Ga. 2010). The Georgia 
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional argument, reasoning that nothing in § 9-11-9.1 
requires defendants to pay for affidavits. Id. The cost of the affidavit is imposed by private parties, not 
the government. Id. As the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions control the state’s 
actions, not individuals’ actions, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 9-11-9.1. 
Id. 
 50. See Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 306 S.E.2d 340, 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) 
(citing Patterson v. Augusta & Savannah R. Co., 21 S.E. 283 (Ga. 1894)). 
 51. Royal v. Harrington, 390 S.E.2d 668, 668 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (“It has long been the law in this 
state that a cause of action for legal malpractice, alleging negligence or unskillfulness, sounds in 
contract (agency), and, in the case of an oral agreement, is subject to the four-year statute of 
limitation . . . .” (quoting Ballard v. Frey, 346 S.E.2d 893, 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984))). Other states, 
including Texas, have declared legal malpractice a tort and treated it accordingly. Willis v. Maverick, 
760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1988). 
 52. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc., 703 S.E.2d 323 (Ga. 2010); 
see also J. RANDOLPH EVANS & SHERI KLEVENS, GEORGIA LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW § 2-4:2.2 (2017) 
(noting that the holdings that “written documents like an engagement letter or title opinion do not 
constitute written contracts for statute of limitations purposes . . . are now unsettled in light of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Newell Recycling, Inc. v. Jordan Jones and Goulding, Inc.”). 
9
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construction of a car recycling plant in 1997.53 The parties 
memorialized their agreement with a “scope of work.”54 In May 
2000, the concrete foundation that Newell paid JJ&G to design 
started cracking, and in August 2004, Newell sued JJ&G for breach 
of contract and professional malpractice.55 Newell Recycling went to 
the Superior Court twice, the Court of Appeals three times, and the 
Supreme Court once.56 The alleged professional malpractice occurred 
in 2000, and the statute of limitations ran in either 2004 or 2006.57 
The courts could not determine whether O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-24 
or 9-3-25 applied until 2012.58 The case purportedly established a 
six-year statute of limitations in professional liability actions if the 
parties reduced their complete agreement to writing.59 This holding is 
unapplied and untested in the context of legal malpractice.60 
Prior to Newell Recycling, the Court of Appeals held that an 
engagement letter was too indefinite to constitute a written contract, 
disqualifying the claim from section 9-3-24’s six-year statute of 
limitations.61 Medical malpractice is the only form of professional 
liability addressed by the Georgia legislature, in which the legislature 
and the courts have combined to implement a discovery rule.62 The 
lack of a dedicated statute, combined with murky case law, virtually 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Newell Recycling, 703 S.E.2d at 324. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc., 731 S.E.2d 361, 363 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 364. 
 59. Newell Recycling, 703 S.E.2d at 325. 
 60. EVANS & KLEVENS, supra note 52, § 2-4:2.3. 
 61. Frates v. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 296 S.E.2d 788, 791 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he 
[engagement] letter merely confirms representation in broad terms and outlines in detail only the fee 
arrangement between the parties. It clearly does not constitute the entire agreement for legal services 
between the parties.”). 
 62. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 (1976) (imposing a two-year statute of limitations and a five-year statute of 
repose from “the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission 
occurred” for medical malpractice actions); O.C.G.A. § 9-3-72 (1976) (adopting the discovery rule 
when a medical provider leaves foreign objects in the patient’s body); O.C.G.A. § 9-3-73 (1976) 
(carving out exceptions to the two-year statute of limitations and five-year statute of repose for minors 
and mentally incompetent persons). The Georgia legislature did not codify the discovery rule for 
medical malpractice until 1976. 1976 Ga. Laws 1363, § 1. Georgia lagged behind many of its neighbors 
in adopting the discovery rule for medical malpractice, including South Carolina, which adopted it in 
1962. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (1962). 
10
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guarantee a court-adjudicated inquisition at the outset of most 
professional liability actions. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Effective statutes of limitations “relieve[] the court system from 
dealing with ‘stale’ claims, and protect potential defendants from 
protracted fear of litigation.”63 Without a clearly defined statute of 
limitations, a cause of action has an unlimited life span.64 Effective 
statutes of limitations should protect the interests of all parties 
involved, without favoring one party over the other.65 Statutes of 
limitations can be particularly problematic in this regard because they 
dispose of a claim based on time, instead of the merits of the case.66 
Even meritorious claims can fall on the statute of limitations without 
ever getting a day in court.67 Safeguarding against this potential 
problem is especially important in the context of legal malpractice.68 
Clients begin disputes at a distinct disadvantage because of attorneys’ 
superior knowledge of the law.69 Many states attempt to even the 
playing field in a number of ways.70 
Aside from Georgia and Arkansas, every state attempts to mitigate 
the inherent inequality of the occurrence rule by modifying their legal 
malpractice statutes of limitations.71 Most states adopted the 
discovery rule for legal malpractice, and in those states the statute of 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 510 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Mich. 1994). For a discussion of statutes of 
limitation in general, see supra note 26. 
 64. See Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical Analysis of a 
Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REV. 209, 211 (1986). 
 65. See id. at 212. 
 66. See id. at 216. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So. 3d 36, 45 (Fla. 2009) (explaining and later 
rejecting the continuous representation rule for Florida (citing Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. 
Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Ky. 1994))); see also Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & 
Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 428 (Cal. 1971). 
 70. See infra Parts II.B–D. 
 71. See Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Minn. 2006) (“[Under] the traditional ‘occurrence’ 
rule . . . the statute of limitations begins to run simultaneously with the performance of the negligent or 
wrongful act. . . . Most jurisdictions have moved away from the occurrence rule.”). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court went on to reject the occurrence rule, because of the potential to encourage “wasteful 
economic behavior” by attorneys and clients. Id. at 335–36. 
11
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limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff-client knew or 
should have known of the attorney’s negligence.72 Other states have 
also moved to the damage rule, which does not start the statute of 
limitations until the plaintiff-client suffers actual damage.73 Other 
states have modified these rules with the continuous representation 
rule, which tolls the statute of limitations while the prospective 
plaintiff and defendant remain in an attorney-client relationship.74 
If the states are the laboratories of democracy75 in the ongoing 
experiment on legal malpractice, then Georgia and Arkansas are the 
control group. Georgia often takes the pragmatic approach of letting 
other states experiment with new legal concepts before adopting 
them.76 In the case of legal malpractice statutes of limitations, forty-
eight states have experimented with different approaches for 
decades.77 Their experiences aide in evaluating the relative merits of 
each approach. Aside from the two relatively minor exceptions 
discussed in Part IIA, infra, Georgia still rigorously adheres to the 
occurrence rule.78 As such, Georgia serves as an excellent base to 
compare and contrast the benefits and pitfalls of other states’ statutes 
of limitations.79 
A. Georgia’s Application of the Occurrence Rule 
Georgia’s unaltered occurrence rule strongly favors defendants, 
especially unscrupulous defendants.80 Essentially, the attorney has a 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See generally FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12. 
 73. Mental Health Assocs., Inc. v. Carlson, 835 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 74. Barnes v. Turner, 606 S.E.2d 849, 852 (Ga. 2004). 
 75. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Georgia’s New Evidence Code—An Overview, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
379, 380–82 (2011) (discussing the slow evolution of Georgia’s Evidence Code); see generally Erwin C. 
Surrency, The Georgia Code of 1863 and its Place in the Codification Movement, 11 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 
81 (2003). The current version of the Official Code of Georgia still contains a significant number of 
vestiges from the 1863 Code, also known as the “Cobb Code” after its primary author. Id. 
 77. See generally FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12. 
 78. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411, 412 (Ga. 1998). 
 79. See FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12. 
 80. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1657, 1689–90 (1994) (discussing how suits are often barred under the occurrence rule). 
12
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“head start” in crafting a statute of limitations defense.81 Attorneys 
are experts on the law and know—or at least should know—when 
their representation fell below the standard of care. Attorneys who 
know that they committed a negligent act or omission have a duty to 
disclose that fact to a client.82 If they do not make that disclosure, 
many clients remain blissfully unaware of the attorney’s negligent act 
until it is too late. That stark realization often does not come until a 
client loses a case.83 If a case runs for four years past the attorney’s 
negligent act, the client is highly unlikely to discover the attorney’s 
negligence until the statute of limitations has run. 
Under the framework put forth in Newell Recycling, most fee 
agreements are too vague to constitute a complete contract, 
precluding a six-year statute of limitations.84 Defendant-attorneys can 
circumvent section 9-3-96, the statute that tolls the statute of 
limitations for fraud, by avoiding writing or saying anything 
incriminating to their—usually former—clients.85 The attorney may 
also take any number of measures that could be interpreted as normal 
representation of the client but are really intended to protect the 
attorney.86 These actions are usually justifiable should the client ever 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 424–25 (Cal. 1971); see also 
Dvorak, supra note 34, at 255–59. 
 82. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2001) (imposing a duty to “promptly inform the client 
of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required” and 
to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter”); GA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (“A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant 
risk that the lawyer’s own interests . . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of the 
client” unless the client gives informed consent to continued representation.). 
 83. Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335–36 (Minn. 2006) (adopting the damage rule and 
explaining that “the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when ‘some’ 
damage has occurred” (citing Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. 
1999))). 
 84. Frates v. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 296 S.E.2d 788, 791 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he 
[engagement] letter merely confirms representation in broad terms and outlines in detail only the fee 
arrangement between the parties. It clearly does not constitute the entire agreement for legal services 
between the parties.”). 
 85. Shores v. Troglin, 580 S.E.2d 659, 660–61 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (denying the appeal of an 
appellant who lost in summary judgment on a statute of limitations defense, because the appellant was 
not able to produce any evidence of “an independent act of fraud” (citing Hunter, Maclean, Exley & 
Dunn v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411, 413–14 (Ga. 1998))); see Richard C. Ruskell, Fraud of the Defendant, 
in DAVIS AND SHULMAN’S GEORGIA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 30:14 (2015–2016 ed.). 
 86. See Ruskell, supra note 85, at § 30:14. 
13
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try to toll the statute for fraud.87 When the time comes to answer 
questions about why it took the client so long to find out about the 
alleged negligent act, an attorney merely has to “play dumb” so that 
it appears simple negligence, not fraud, was the reason the client 
never found out about the malpractice.88 Georgia’s narrow allowance 
to toll the statute of limitations for fraud presents unscrupulous 
attorneys ample opportunity to escape liability for negligence.89 
Tolling the statute of limitations for fraud is one of two small 
concessions that Georgia has afforded to legal malpractice 
plaintiffs.90 “[T]he fraud which will relieve the bar of the statute of 
limitation must be of that character which involves moral turpitude, 
and must have the effect of debarring and deterring the plaintiff from 
his action.”91 Fraud of the nature and magnitude required by Georgia 
courts to toll the statute is very difficult to prove, especially when the 
proof of fraud lies in the hands of an attorney fighting to protect his 
career and professional reputation.92 Additionally, when interpreting 
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96, courts have unequivocally held that gross 
negligence that leads to passive concealment of malpractice will not 
toll the statute of limitations.93 
                                                                                                                 
 87. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2016) (allowing a plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations for fraud, with the 
statute beginning to run when the plaintiff discovers the fraud). 
 88. Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, L.L.L.P., 766 S.E.2d 497, 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no actual 
evidence of fraud that would toll the statute of limitations, and noting that “under Georgia law, fraud 
that gives rise to a cause of action does not necessarily establish the fraud necessary to toll the statute of 
limitation” (quoting Hendry v. Wells, 650 S.E.2d 338, 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007))). 
 89. See, e.g., Barnes v. Turner, 606 S.E.2d 849, 852 (Ga. 2004); Hunter, 507 S.E.2d at 412; Shores, 
580 S.E.2d at 660–61. 
 90. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2016). While this exception is small, it is essential in a jurisdiction that uses 
the occurrence rule without the continuous representation rule. George L. Blum, Attorney Malpractice—
Tolling or Other Exceptions to Running of Statute of Limitations, 87 A.L.R.5th 473, § 2[b] (2001). 
 91. Riddle v. Driebe, 265 S.E.2d 92, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that statements by the attorney 
to the client that documents he prepared were legally sufficient was not “actionable as actual fraud nor 
designed to deter or debar Riddle from bringing suit”); Wood v. Noland Credit Co., 149 S.E.2d 720, 721 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (explaining that broken promises do not equate to fraud); see also Shores, 580 
S.E.2d at 661 (declining to toll the statute because the plaintiff failed to present any “evidence of an 
independent act of fraud that prevented him from discovering the alleged malpractice or filing suit”). 
 92. Hyman v. Jordan, 412 S.E.2d 615, 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (declining to toll the statute because 
the plaintiff “did not show that [he] was prevented or deterred by any act of [the defendants] from 
discovering [their] alleged negligence” (citing Kilby v. Shepherd, 339 S.E.2d 742, 744 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1986))). 
 93. Hunter, 507 S.E.2d at 413 (“[I]t must be shown that the defendant concealed information by an 
intentional act—something more than a ‘mere failure, with fraudulent intent, to disclose such 
14
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Georgia’s second concession to legal malpractice plaintiffs is the 
so-called “springing statute of limitations.”94 In Barnes v. Turner, the 
defendant attorney failed to inform a client that the U.C.C. liens the 
attorney filed on his behalf needed to be renewed in five years.95 That 
failure occurred in 1996, but the plaintiff did not discover the 
attorney’s failure until 2002—six years after the negligent act.96 The 
court, aware of the fact that the lien had to be renewed in five years 
and that the legal malpractice statute of limitations is four years, 
recognized the inherent incompatibility between the statute of 
limitations and the cause of action.97 Rather than find that the 
negligent act took place in 1996 with the attorney’s failure to inform 
the client of the renewal requirement, the Court held that the attorney 
had an ongoing duty to “safeguard [the client’s] security interest.”98 
After Barnes, the springing statute of limitations applies when 
attorneys assume an obligation to safeguard a client’s long-term 
interests, even after the four-year statute of limitations has run.99 
Although the Court carved out a small accommodation to legal 
malpractice plaintiffs in Barnes, it also took the opportunity to 
expressly reject the continuous representation rule.100 
                                                                                                                 
conduct . . . .’” (quoting Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 267 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980))); Farmers 
State Bank v. Huguenin, 469 S.E.2d 34, 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (“Negligence, even gross negligence, 
does not generally constitute fraud involving moral turpitude.”). 
 94. EVANS & KLEVENS, supra note 52, § 2-4:4.4. 
 95. Barnes v. Turner, 606 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Ga. 2004). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 851–52. 
 98. Id. at 852. 
 99. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 649 S.E.2d 779, 785–86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining the 
springing statute of limitations established in Barnes v. Turner but declining to apply it, holding that it 
only applies to legal malpractice). 
 100. Barnes, 606 S.E.2d at 852 (rejecting the continuous representation rule without explanation). In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Benham accused the majority of adopting the continuous representation 
rule along with the springing statute of limitations. Id. at 853–55 (Benham, J. dissenting). The springing 
statute of limitations keeps the attorney–client relationship alive for long-term obligations that last 
beyond the four-year statute of limitations by holding that the attorney owes the client a long-term duty 
absent a contractual provision or other writing expressly terminating the relationship. Id. at 851–52. 
What the majority was essentially saying, according to Justice Benham, was that the long-term duty 
created a long-term attorney–client relationship, and that relationship tolls the statute of limitations. Id. 
at 852–55 (Benham, J., dissenting). In Barnes, both the majority and dissent rejected the continuing 
representation rule. Id. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court expanded upon its rejection of the continuous representation rule in 
Epstein. Epstein v. Brown, 610 S.E.2d 816 (S.C. 2005). The continuous representation rule evolved out 
15
Rosichan: Forty-Eight States Are Probably Not Wrong: An Argument for Modernizing Georgia’s Legal Malpractice Statute Of Limitations
Published by Reading Room, 2017
820 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
B. The Continuous Representation Rule 
The continuous representation rule tolls the statute of limitations 
while the prospective plaintiff and defendant remain in an attorney–
client relationship.101 The Georgia Supreme Court flatly rejected the 
continuous representation rule in Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, 
P.C. v. Frame and Barnes v. Turner.102 In Hunter, the Court 
expressed concern that tolling the statute of limitations while the 
attorney and client are in an ongoing relationship would give the 
client the ability to toll the statute indefinitely.103 The Court reasoned 
that under such a rule, a client could continue the confidential 
relationship indefinitely, “even if the plaintiff was fully aware of the 
facts underlying his allegation of malpractice, but merely slept on his 
right to bring suit.”104 By contrast, the defendant attorney in such a 
situation could only stop the statute from tolling by severing the 
confidential relationship and exposing himself to a malpractice 
suit.105 
Georgia courts are not alone in their rejection of the continuous 
representation rule, although they are more vociferous than other 
states. In Florida, some appellate courts adopted the continuous 
representation rule until the Florida Supreme Court expressly rejected 
it in 2009.106 Florida uses the discovery rule for professional 
malpractice and enumerates instances that toll the statute of 
limitations.107 The Florida Supreme Court held that the omission of 
                                                                                                                 
of the continuous treatment rule from medical malpractice. Hipple v. McFadden, 255 P.3d 730, 737 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2011). In Preer v. Mims, the South Carolina rejected the continuous treatment doctrine. 
Preer v. Mims, 476 S.E.2d 472, 473–74 (S.C. 1996). Because of the similarity between the two rules, 
the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to adopt the continuous representation rule. Epstein, 610 
S.E.2d at 818–19. 
 101. Barnes, 606 S.E.2d at 852. 
 102. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411, 415 (Ga. 1998); Barnes, 606 S.E.2d 
at 852. 
 103. Hunter, 507 S.E.2d at 415. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Industries, Inc., 22 So. 3d 36, 46 (Fla. 2009). 
 107. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (2016). The relevant code provision states: 
An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether 
founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run [for 
two years] from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been 
discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions 
16
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an ongoing attorney–client relationship from the enumerated acts was 
sufficient evidence of the legislature’s intent to adopt the discovery 
rule without the continuous representation rule and declined to adopt 
the rule in the absence of statutory authority.108 South Carolina, 
another neighboring state that uses the discovery rule, has also 
declined to adopt the continuous representation rule in the absence of 
statutory authority.109 
Other states have taken a contrary position on the continuous 
representation rule. Indiana, for example, adopted the continuous 
representation rule primarily to “avoid disrupting the attorney–client 
relationship.”110 Indiana and many other states are concerned that 
under the occurrence rule, a client may be forced to terminate an 
attorney’s representation during ongoing litigation to sue the attorney 
for malpractice, disrupting the underlying lawsuit to create a new 
one.111 In New York, the statute of limitations is three years, running 
from the date of the negligent act.112 The New York Court of Appeals 
found the continuous representation rule appropriate in light of the 
special relationship of trust and confidence between attorney and 
client.113 
                                                                                                                 
herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the 
professional. 
Id. Section 95.051 lists nine acts or events that toll the statute of limitations in Florida. FLA. STAT. 
§ 95.051 (2016). 
 108. Larson & Larson, P.A., 22 So. 3d at 46 (“In sum, the position urged by TSE and the analysis 
employed by the Second District are wholly detached from the governing statute, which ties the running 
of the limitations period for lawyer malpractice claims to ‘the time the cause of action is discovered or 
should have been discovered.’”). 
 109. Epstein v. Brown, 610 S.E.2d 816, 820 (S.C. 2005) (“[I]n light of the Legislature’s declaration 
that an action ‘must be commenced within three years after the person knew or by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known he had a cause of action,’ we decline to adopt the continuous 
representation rule.”). 
 110. Biomet, Inc. v. Barnes & Thornburg, 791 N.E.2d 760, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing RONALD 
E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, 3 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 22.13, at 430–31 (5th ed. 2000)). 
 111. Biomet, 791 N.E.2d at 765–66. 
 112. N.Y.C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2015); Citibank, N.A. v. Suthers, 68 A.D.2d 790, 795 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1979). 
 113. Glamm v. Allen, 439 N.E.2d 390, 393 (N.Y. 1982) (applying the continuous representation rule, 
reasoning that “since it is impossible not to envision a situation where commencing a malpractice suit 
would not affect the professional relationship, the rule of continuous representation tolls the running of 
the Statute of Limitations on the malpractice claim until the ongoing representation is completed”). The 
special relationship of trust and confidence is an often-cited justification for the continuous 
representation rule. See, e.g., Keaton Co. v. Kolby, 271 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ohio 1971). Ohio’s Supreme 
17
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Changing attorneys during the course of ongoing litigation can be 
fatal to both the underlying dispute and the subsequent legal 
malpractice action.114 Under the occurrence rule, clients may be 
forced into a choice of suing their attorney before the underlying suit 
has ended or filing suit against their attorney during the course of 
ongoing litigation to preserve the claim before the statute of 
limitations expires.115 Should the client choose to file the malpractice 
claim during representation, the client will likely have to find a new 
attorney for the remainder of the underlying dispute.116 In the 
subsequent legal malpractice action, the negligent attorney’s defense 
counsel can attack causation by contending that the client’s rash 
decision to fire the defendant attorney, not the defendant attorney’s 
negligence, was the proximate cause of damage in the underlying 
case.117 
Some states have argued that the continuous representation rule is 
good for both attorney and client.118 Unlike the occurrence rule, the 
continuous representation rule does not force a client in an ongoing 
confidential relationship with an attorney to file suit quickly in fear 
of the statute of limitations expiring.119 Under this theory, tolling the 
statute of limitations during an ongoing confidential relationship buys 
the attorney time to correct the problem that led to the client’s 
dissatisfaction before the client is compelled to file suit to preserve 
                                                                                                                 
Court held that the attorney–client relationship requires the same degree of trust and confidence as the 
doctor–patient relationship. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that in light of the similar level of 
trust and confidence, it was appropriate to apply the continuous treatment rule from medical malpractice 
to legal malpractice actions as the continuing treatment rule. Id. 
 114. Glamm, 439 N.E.2d at 393 (“Neither is a person expected to jeopardize his pending case or his 
relationship with the attorney handling that case during the period that the attorney continues to 
represent the person.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Rosenfield v. Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle, L.L.C., 795 A.2d 572, 580 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2002) (discussing the policy reasons underpinning the continuous representation rule); see also 
Ronald E. Mallen, Limitations and the Need for “Damages” in Legal Malpractice Actions, 60 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 234, 247 (1993). 
 118. Janicki Logging & Constr. Co. v. Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., 37 P.3d 309, 314 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 119. Epstein v. Brown, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818–19 (S.C. 2005) (discussing the policy reasons behind 
rejection of the continuous representation rule). 
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the statute of limitations.120 In Janicki Logging v. Schwabe, the 
Washington Court of Appeals adopted the continuous representation 
rule using this rationale in a state where “the decision of when to toll 
the statute of limitations [is] a ‘matter of judicial policy.’”121 
Another persuasive argument for the continuous representation 
rule is that it eliminates an element of subjectivity from the 
determination of when the statute of limitations begins to accrue.122 
Parties are either in an attorney–client relationship or they are not.123 
The continuous representation rule eliminates the inherent harshness 
of the occurrence rule but does not require the same sort of analysis 
of the attendant facts required under either the damage rule or the 
discovery rule.124 Regardless, Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. 
v. Frame strongly suggests that the Georgia Supreme Court will not 
unilaterally change a statute of limitations, and any action would 
need to come through the General Assembly.125 
C. The Damage Rule 
Damages are usually the last element of a legal malpractice claim 
to materialize.126 The damage rule recognizes this fundamental 
proposition and pegs the accrual of the statute of limitations to the 
plaintiff sustaining damage.127 Unlike the discovery rule, the 
existence of damage, not the plaintiff’s knowledge of damage, starts 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Jennifer Thornton, Comment, Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:5605: A Louisiana Lawyer’s 
Best Friend, 74 TUL. L. REV. 659, 667–68 (1999). 
 121. Janicki, 37 P.3d at 315 (citing Peters v. Simmons, 552 P.2d 1053 (Wash. 1976)). 
 122. James L. Floyd, III, South Carolina Tort Law: For Whom The Statute of Limitations Tolls—The 
Epstein Court’s Rejection of the Continuous Representation Rule, 57 S.C. L. REV. 643, 662 (discussing 
South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Toal’s dissent and her desire to create a “bright line rule” 
to create certainty as to when the statute of limitations actually begins accruing). 
 123. DAVID J. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE, 4–8 (1980). 
 124. Id. at 75. 
 125. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411, 413 (Ga. 1998) (“[P]rescribing 
periods of limitation is a legislative, not a judicial, function . . . .”). 
 126. MEISELMAN, supra note 123, at 55–59; see also Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 158 N.W.2d 580, 
585 (Minn. 1968) (“Until there is some damage, there is no claim . . . .” (citing Brush Beryllium Co. v. 
Meckley, 284 F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1960))). 
 127. Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335–36 (Minn. 2006) (adopting the damage rule and 
explaining that “the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when ‘some’ 
damage has occurred” (quoting Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. 
1999))). 
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the accrual of the statute of limitations.128 Litigation regarding 
statutes of limitations under the damage rule generally centers around 
how much damage suffices to begin accrual of the statute of 
limitations.129 Some states, like Minnesota, have required 
“compensable damage” before the statute begins accruing.130 
Idaho uses the damage rule for legal malpractice actions, despite 
using a statute of limitations that looks like the occurrence rule.131 
The courts in Idaho have adopted a somewhat flexible definition of 
damages.132 In rejecting Minnesota’s compensable damage 
requirement, Idaho courts have allowed the statute of limitations to 
begin running for damages other than an adverse judgment in the 
underlying case.133 Idaho’s broad interpretation of damages allows 
the courts some flexibility in determining when damages began to 
accrue, which in turn gives them flexibility to make rulings on the 
statute of limitations that make sense in each individual case.134 
It is hard to argue against the simplicity of the damage rule. The 
rule keeps with generally accepted principles of tort law, namely the 
principle that there can be no cause of action without damages.135 
Even though the cause of action can hardly be described as anything 
other than negligence, many jurisdictions cling to the notion that 
professional liability is either a breach of contract or a strange hybrid 
of negligence and breach of contract.136 Georgia is one of those 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Jay A. Summerville, State of Missouri, in FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12, at 276 
(discussing Missouri’s application of the damage rule). 
 129. Fairway Dev. Co. v. Petersen, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 865 P.2d 957, 959–60 (Idaho 
1993) (providing a history of how Idaho courts have interpreted “some damage” since adaptation of the 
damage rule). 
 130. Antone, 720 N.W.2d at 336. 
 131. IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4) (2015). The Idaho Supreme Court explained the statute of limitations as 
follows: “Idaho law provides that the statute of limitations on a professional malpractice claim will 
expire two years following the occurrence, act or omission complained of, barring fraudulent or 
knowing concealment of the injury, and will not be extended due to any continuing consequences, 
damages, or continuing professional relationship.” Fairway Dev. Co., 865 P.2d at 959. 
 132. Keely E. Duke, State of Idaho, in FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12, at 131. 
 133. McColm-Traska v. Baker, 88 P.3d 767, 772 (Idaho 2004) (holding that Idaho does not require an 
adverse ruling prior to pursuing a professional liability action). 
 134. Fairway Dev. Co., 865 P.2d at 959–60 (providing a history of how Idaho courts have interpreted 
“some damage” since adaptation of the damage rule and illustrate how Idaho judges have the leeway to 
make the statute of limitations accrue at a point that is appropriate in each individual case). 
 135. WILLIAM J. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). 
 136. MEISELMAN, supra note 123, at 18–19. 
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jurisdictions, considering professional liability a breach of an 
incomplete written or oral agreement.137 
In Georgia, nominal damages are available for legal malpractice.138 
Although “nominal damages” is a relative term, it may be no more 
than a “trifling sum awarded where a breach of duty or an infraction 
of the plaintiff’s right is shown, but no serious loss is proved to have 
been sustained.”139 Given this definition of nominal damages, 
defendants could and likely would argue that plaintiffs suffered not 
even a “trifling sum” of damages at the time the negligent act 
occurred.140 If the General Assembly or the courts were to adopt the 
damage rule without readdressing the availability of nominal 
damages in legal malpractice actions, it would be nothing more than 
a repackaged occurrence rule.141 
D. The Discovery Rule 
The discovery rule traces its lineage to principles first established 
to address medical malpractice.142 Most jurisdictions, including 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue v. Am. Envirecycle, Inc., 456 S.E.2d 264, 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) 
(applying section 9-3-25 of Georgia’s code, the statute of limitations for breach of an incomplete written 
or oral agreement). 
 138. Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 273 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 1980); see also Kirby v. Chester, 
331 S.E.2d 915, 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). “Nominal damages have been held not to be recoverable 
where the theory of liability sounds in tort rather than contract. The rationale is that an attorney should 
be liable only for causing actual harm.” RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, 3 LEGAL 
MALPRACtice § 21:5 (2016). 
 139. Sellers v. Mann, 39 S.E. 11, 11 (Ga. 1901) (quoting 2 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 504). 
 140. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-4. “If an injury is small or the mitigating circumstances are strong, nominal 
damages only are given.” Id. “Damages compensate from injury and may be inferred from invasion of a 
property right. Where no actual damage flows from the injury, nominal damages may be awarded. Yet, 
some injury—even if small or nominal—is necessary.” Conner v. Hart, 555 S.E.2d 783, 786 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2001) (discussing when nominal damages are appropriate). Nominal damages may be awarded 
even for minor injuries, such as those that usually happen at the time of the defendant attorney’s 
negligent act. Id. 
 141. MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 138, at § 21:5. According to Mallen and Rhodes: 
The concept of nominal damages, however, does serve a necessary function in those jurisdictions that 
purport to follow the rule that a statute of limitations commences to run when the negligence occurs. If 
suit must be brought within a specified period from the wrongful act or omission, and before any actual 
damages occur, nominal damages are indispensable to a cause of action. As the use of the occurrence 
rule declines, so should the need to sue for nominal damages. Both are anachronisms in legal 
malpractice litigation. Ironically, very few decisions discussing the right to recover nominal damages 
have affirmed or awarded such a judgment. 
Id. 
 142. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 426 (Cal. 1971). 
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Georgia, believe that it is inherently unfair to allow the statute of 
limitations to begin accruing before the plaintiff-patient even knows 
that he should be filing a lawsuit.143 In recognition of that potential 
for injustice, thirty-eight states do not begin to run the statute of 
limitations until the plaintiff knows or should have known with due 
diligence the existence of the cause of action.144 
California was an early adopter of the discovery rule.145 California 
adhered to the occurrence rule until 1970.146 In 1971, the California 
Supreme Court found the policy behind the discovery rule 
compelling enough to adopt it outright.147 Like the continuous 
representation rule, the discovery rule recognizes the special trust and 
confidence that the client places in the attorney.148 The California 
Supreme Court found it problematic that attorneys were shielded 
from liability that applied to other professions where the relationship 
between professional and client is not as interdependent.149 It also 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Clark v. Singer, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (Ga. 1983) (“To impose a limitation period which may be 
exhausted before the cause of action accrues (i.e., before the patient dies), arbitrarily distinguishes 
between wrongful death, medical malpractice plaintiffs.”). 
 144. Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Minn. 2006) (“At the other end of the spectrum is the 
‘discovery’ rule, under which the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run only 
when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury.”). 
 145. MEISELMAN, supra note 123, at 74. 
 146. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 463 P.2d 770, 776 (Cal. 1970) (explaining 
precedent in California for statutes of limitations and finding that “[t]he rule that the cause of action 
accrues when the negligent act occurs has been strictly applied in attorney malpractice situations”). 
 147. Neel, 491 P.2d at 432–33. In Neel, the California Supreme Court noted that while appellate court 
opinions in California had characterized the occurrence rule as harsh, unfair, and discriminatory in the 
past and carved out individual exceptions to the rule, none were willing to adopt the discovery rule 
outright until this case. Id. at 426–27. 
 148. Id. at 428. 
 149. Id. at 429. (“The relation between attorney and client is a fiduciary relation of the highest 
character.” (quoting Cox v. Delmas, 33 P. 836, 839 (Cal. 1893))). The Court summarized its view on 
how the discovery rule protects the integrity of the profession at the end of the case: 
[I]n our complex and inter-dependent society, human relations are ever being 
further fit into a framework of legal rights and responsibilities, and, this process 
must broaden and deepen. Today, then, is no time to perpetuate an anachronistic 
interpretation of the statute of limitations that permits the attorney to escape 
obligations which other professionals must bear. The legal calling can ill afford 
the preservation of a privileged protection against responsibility, a privilege born 
of error, subject to almost universal condemnation, and, in present-day society, 
anomalous. 
Id. at 433–34. 
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recognized the occurrence rule’s potential abuse by defendant-
attorneys: 
[W]hen an attorney raises the statute of limitations to 
occlude a client’s action before that client has had a 
reasonable opportunity to bring suit, the resulting ban of the 
action not only starkly works an injustice upon the client 
but partially impugns the very integrity of the legal 
profession.150 
All of Georgia’s neighbors have adopted some variation of the 
discovery rule.151 Like most states, South Carolina and California 
chose to adopt the discovery rule for similar reasons.152 South 
Carolina did, however, explicitly state that “reasonable diligence” 
requires “some promptness” by the plaintiff after discovery of the 
cause of action.153 Additionally, discovery triggers accrual of the 
statute.154 This does not require a “full blown theory of recovery” but 
must be more than a mere conversation with the attorney.155 
Tennessee’s discovery rule evaluation places weight on the 
significance of damage to the plaintiff.156 Like South Carolina, 
Tennessee does not require the plaintiff to fully develop a legal 
theory to satisfy the knowledge requirement of the discovery rule; the 
state requires only that he knows the existence of the cause of action 
in general.157 
Alabama may be one of the few states more judicially conservative 
than Georgia.158 It is one of the four remaining states that still uses 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 431. 
 151. ALA. CODE § 6-5-574 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (2016); N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-15(C) 
(2015); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-530, -535 (2016); John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 
528, 532 (Tenn. 1998). 
 152. Santee Portland Cement Co. v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 384 S.E.2d 693, 694–95 (S.C. 1989) 
(discussing the policy reasons behind South Carolina’s adoption of the discovery rule for professional 
liability actions). 
 153. Epstein v. Brown, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (S.C. 2005). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. John Kohl & Co., 977 S.W.2d at 532. 
 157. Id. at 533. 
 158. See Political Outlook of State Supreme Court Justices, BALLOTPEDIA, 
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the archaic and harsh rule of contributory negligence as a complete 
bar to recovery in negligence actions.159 For all intents and purposes, 
Alabama’s basic legal malpractice statute of limitations is a fairly 
restrictive version of the damage rule.160 In Alabama, a legal 
malpractice suit must be filed within two years accrual of the cause 
of action, with a four-year statute of repose.161 Even under this 
restrictive regime, the Alabama legislature does allow a plaintiff to 
bring an action “within six months of the date of such discovery or 
the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such 
discovery.”162 Alabama’s discovery rule is draconian and limited, but 
it still protects a wronged plaintiff better than the occurrence rule.163 
The wronged client must move quickly, but potentially meritorious 
claims are not dead merely because the statute of limitations ran 
before the client had any chance to find out about the cause of 
action.164 
North Carolina, another one of Georgia’s neighbors that has 
chosen to remain in the minority of states that still adhere to 
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery, has taken a 
less draconian approach to legal malpractice.165 North Carolina has a 
                                                                                                                 
ballotpedia.org/Political_outlook_of_state_supreme_court_justices (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
 159. Williams v. Deltan Int’l Mach. Corp., 619 So.2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1993). It appears that by the 
end of the twentieth century, the Alabama Supreme Court was upholding the doctrine of contributory 
negligence out of inertia: 
We have heard hours of oral argument; we have read numerous briefs; we have 
studied cases from other jurisdictions and law review articles; and in numerous 
conferences we have discussed in depth the issue and all of the ramifications 
surrounding such a change. After this exhaustive study and these lengthy 
deliberations, the majority of this Court, for various reasons, has decided that we 
should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the 
law in Alabama for approximately 162 years. 
Id. (citing Bethea v. Taylor, 3 Stew. 482 (Ala. 1831)). There have, however, been strong urgings to 
change the harsh contributory negligence rule in the past. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saint, 646 So.2d 
564, 568–69 (Ala. 1994) (Hornsby, C.J., dissenting). In General Motors Corp. v. Saint, Chief Justice 
Hornsby described the rule as archaic and overly harsh. Id.; see also Campbell v. Ala. Power Co., 567 
So.2d 1222, 1227–31 (Ala. 1990) (Hornsby, C.J., dissenting). 
 160. Aaron G. McLeod & Stephen A. Rowe, State of Alabama, in FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 
12, at 5–6. 
 161. ALA. CODE § 6-5-574 (1988); see also Michael v. Beasley, 583 So.2d. 245, 246 (Ala. 1991). 
 162. ALA. CODE § 6-5-574. 
 163. See supra Part II.A. 
 164. See supra Part II.A. 
 165. Hummer v. Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., 536 S.E.2d 349, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); 
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three-year statute of limitations and a four-year statute of repose for 
legal malpractice.166 North Carolina has statutorily modified its basic 
rule, adding the discovery rule and giving plaintiffs one year after 
discovery of the cause of action to file suit.167 
Delaware’s tangled mess of case law regarding the discovery rule 
illustrates what happens when the courts and the legislature do not 
speak with one voice on something as basic and important as a statute 
of limitations.168 The Delaware legislature has imposed a three-year 
statute of limitations on legal malpractice.169 Generally, Delaware 
courts have rigidly adhered to the statute of limitations.170 At times, 
however, Delaware courts used the discovery rule to toll the statute 
of limitations.171 This sort of inconsistency defeats one of the primary 
purposes of a statute of limitations: predictability.172 
Hawaii, New Jersey, and Wisconsin all use the discovery rule and 
have a six-year statute of limitations.173 A lengthy statute of 
limitations would violate two important policy drivers of the statute 
of limitations in Georgia.174 A statute of limitations that does not 
begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the cause of action may 
extend well past six years after the occurrence of the negligent act.175 
The extreme gap between the negligent act and litigation greatly 
increases the likelihood that key evidence will not be available by the 
time the plaintiff actually files suit.176 Additionally, the cause of 
                                                                                                                 
see also Molly L. McIntosh, State of North Carolina, in FIFTY STATE SURVEY, supra note 12, at 365–
67. 
 166. Molly L. McIntosh, State of North Carolina, in FIFTY STATE SURVEY, supra note 12, at 365–66. 
 167. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c)). 
 168. Tanya E. Pino, State of Delaware, in FIFTY STATE SURVEY, supra note 12, at 81–83. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 173. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1 (1963); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.53 (2006); Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 
472 n.17 (Haw. 2001). 
 174. Clark v. Singer, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (Ga. 1983). 
 175. Id. (“Statutes of limitation . . . are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have 
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”). 
 176. Id. 
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action needs an expiration date so the negligent attorney does not live 
in the shadow of potentially pending litigation.177 
Some states have adopted the discovery rule through judicial 
action and others have statutorily adopted it.178 The Supreme Court 
of Georgia rejects the notion that it can adopt a statute of limitations 
in the absence of legislative action.179 As such, they have never 
addressed the discovery rule in the context of professional liability.180 
Other states have criticized the discovery rule as providing “open-
ended liability.”181 Some states do not believe that controls like those 
imposed by Georgia’s neighbors go far enough to “defend stale 
claims, to preserve evidence, and to treat all plaintiffs equally.”182 
Some courts prefer the more objective standard of the damage rule to 
the discovery rule’s evaluation of the plaintiff’s knowledge.183 
Thirty-eight states have rejected this rationale and adopted some 
variation of the discovery rule.184 
III. PROPOSAL 
The facts and experiences of other states strongly suggest that the 
discovery rule is the most effective statute of limitations for legal 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id. (“The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice 
to defend within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to peril 
over the right to prosecute.”). 
 178. Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So. 3d 36, 46 (Fla. 2009) (overruling a lower 
court’s unilateral adaptation of the continuous representation rule in Florida); Antone v. Mirviss, 720 
N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn. 2006) (judicially adopting the damage rule in Minnesota); Epstein v. Brown, 
610 S.E.2d 816, 818–21 (S.C. 2005) (judicially adopting the discovery rule but declining to adopt the 
continuous representation rule because the South Carolina legislature had not adopted such a rule with 
its medical malpractice statute of limitations); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988) 
(judicially adopting the discovery rule for Texas); Janicki Logging & Constr. Co., 37 P.3d. 309, 315 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (judicially adopting the damage rule for Washington). But see Hunter, Maclean, 
Exley & Dunn, P.C., v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411, 413 (Ga. 1998) (declining to judicially modify a statute 
of limitations). 
 179. Hunter, 507 S.E.2d at 413. 
 180. See Stafford-Fox v. Jenkins, 639 S.E.2d 610, 615–23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (Andrews, J. 
concurring). 
 181. Antone, 720 N.W.2d at 335 (citing RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 3 LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE § 22.15, at 420 (2006)). 
 182. Ragar v. Brown, 964 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Ark. 1998) (rationalizing Arkansas’s continued 
adherence to the occurrence rule, even though the Court “recognize[d] the harshness of this rule”). 
 183. Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (Idaho 1984). 
 184. See generally FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12. 
26
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/6
2017] FORTY-EIGHT STATES ARE PROBABLY NOT WRONG 831 
malpractice. The discovery rule protects clients by tolling the statute 
of limitations until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have 
discovered the attorney’s negligence.185 It eliminates the occurrence 
rule’s “head start” for negligent attorneys to craft a statute of 
limitations defense by not accruing the statute of limitations until 
both the attorney and the client are aware of the cause of action.186 It 
protects clients in all cases, not just the limited set of facts covered by 
the continuous representation rule.187 Unlike the damage rule, there is 
no potential for the discovery rule to be eviscerated by Georgia’s 
allowance of nominal damages for legal malpractice.188 A discovery 
rule statute of limitations that balances the interests of all interested 
parties—the plaintiff-client, defendant-attorney, the legal profession, 
and the legislature—may look something like this: 
a) An action for professional negligence against an 
attorney shall be brought within two years after the 
date on which the plaintiff discovered, or should 
have discovered, through the exercise of due 
diligence, all of the elements of the cause of action; 
b) When an attorney undertakes to safeguard a client’s 
security interest for longer than five years, or when 
the claim of negligence is based on wills or trusts 
where all of the elements of the cause of action 
could not reasonably be discovered within five 
years of the date on which the negligent act 
occurred, the action shall be brought within one 
year after the negligent or wrongful act or omission 
is discovered; 
c) Except under the conditions outlined in subsection 
(b) and notwithstanding subsection (a), in no event 
may an action for professional negligence against 
an attorney be brought more than five years after 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Epstein v. Brown, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818–21 (S.C. 2005). 
 186. Id. at 415. 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
 188. See supra Part II.C. 
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the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission occurred. 
The discovery rule is not a one-size-fits-all rule. For example, 
states with as diverse priorities and political motivations as Utah and 
California have adopted the discovery rule for legal malpractice. 
Each of the thirty-eight states that have adopted some form of the 
discovery rule have adopted a version reflecting that state’s priorities 
and interests.189 Even states such as Texas, a state with an active tort 
reform movement, recognize the sense in adopting the discovery rule 
for legal malpractice.190 Georgia’s neighbors all have robust and 
active tort reform movements, yet they all have adopted some form 
of the discovery rule.191 Thus, the adoption of the discovery rule for 
legal malpractice in Georgia would not be a novel development, 
provided that its version of the discovery rule reflects the state’s 
values. 
A. Practical Considerations for a Discovery Rule in Georgia 
For Georgia to move past the occurrence rule, any version of the 
discovery rule must match Georgia’s political and legislative 
priorities. Neither the Georgia courts nor the General Assembly have 
engaged in a serious discussion about adopting the discovery rule for 
legal malpractice, but it is not impossible to infer some important 
guiding principles. Many of the principles and considerations that led 
Georgia courts to shape the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See generally FIFTY-STATE SURVEY, supra note 12, at 495–96. 
 190. McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also Tort Reform in 
Texas: “Rove’s Genius at Work,” PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architect/ 
texas/tort.html (Apr. 12, 2005). For a discussion of Texas’s adaptation of the discovery rule for legal 
malpractice actions, see supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 191. Dan Berexa, Three Years of Tennessee Tort Reform–The Essentials, TENN. LAW BLOG (Aug. 5, 
2013), http://www.tennlawblog.com/dan_berexas_tennessee_law/2013/08/recap-of-three-years-of-
tennessee-tort-reform.html; Brian A. Comer, South Carolina Tort Reform Statewide Becomes Effective 
January 1, 2012, S.C. PROD. LIAB. LAW (Feb. 9, 2012, 8:59 AM), http://scproductsliabilitylaw. 
blogspot.com/2012/02/south-carolinas-tort-reform-statute.html; Carin Dorman Brock & George A. 
McMullin, Tort Reform Legislation in Alabama, BUTLER WEIHMULLER KATZ CRAIG (Apr. 1, 2012), 
http://www.butler.legal/tort-reform-legislation-in-alabama; North Carolina Tort Reform and How it 
Affects You, WILSON LAW (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.wilsonlawpa.com/blog/north-carolina-tort-
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into a fair, effective statute are no less applicable for legal 
malpractice. 
In Clark v. Singer, the Supreme Court of Georgia analyzed the 
constitutionality of medical malpractice that results in death.192 In 
that case, the plaintiff’s husband died of carcinoma of the lung on 
June 11, 1979, and the plaintiff filed suit on June 8, 1981.193 The 
plaintiff contended that the defendant doctors would have discovered 
the condition prior to June 3, 1978, had they exercised reasonable 
care.194 In 1979, medical malpractice actions had a two-year statute 
of limitations running from the date of the negligent act.195 The court 
held that “[t]o impose a limitation period which may be exhausted 
before the cause of action accrues (i.e., before the patient dies), 
arbitrarily distinguishes between wrongful death, medical 
malpractice plaintiffs” and that the statute of limitations did not begin 
to run until the plaintiff’s husband actually died.196 
Clark v. Singer and subsequent cases regarding the 
constitutionality of medical malpractice statutes of limitations are 
illustrative of Georgia’s priorities. The Clark Court acknowledged 
that statutes of limitations are a means of guarding against stale 
claims and the prospect of endless litigation.197 However, the Court 
criticized the prospect of a statute of limitations that allowed a claim 
to expire before it had fully formed to the point of being a cognizable 
claim.198 The ultimate result of Clark v. Singer and its progeny was 
that, for medical malpractice cases, using the statute of limitations 
runs afoul of equal protection when barring a claim before the 
plaintiff discovers the injury.199 
The Georgia courts and legislature have already determined that a 
two-year statute of limitations strikes an optimum balance between 
all of the different interests involved in a statute of limitations for 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Clark v. Singer, 298 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1983). 
 193. Id. 
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 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 486. 
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medical malpractice actions.200 A two-year statute of limitations that 
runs from the date that the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should 
have discovered all elements of the cause of action, including 
compensable damages, provides attorneys and clients with the same 
playing field that doctors and patients have for medical malpractice 
actions in Georgia.201 For legal malpractice, most states that use the 
discovery rule have either a two- or three-year statute of 
limitations.202 Georgia’s policy determination regarding medical 
malpractice falls in line with most states’ policy determinations for 
legal malpractice. 
Statutes of repose are less common in states that use the discovery 
rule for legal malpractice, but a statute of repose is appropriate in 
Georgia. The General Assembly is not inclined to pass laws that 
make it easier to bring a lawsuit in the state.203 A five-year statute of 
repose forecloses the prospect of endless litigation in the majority of 
cases.204 The statute of repose may be problematic in some legal 
malpractice cases because the cause of action may not be 
discoverable for many years after a statute of repose has run.205 
Georgia has already addressed that problem judicially by 
implementing the springing statute of limitations.206 It addressed a 
similarly problematic subset of medical malpractice—foreign objects 
left in the body after a medical procedure—by statutorily creating a 
special exception for such cases.207 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-72 allows 
plaintiffs to bring an action within one year after discovery of the 
negligent act for foreign objects left in the body.208 Thus, statutorily 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Clark, 298 S.E.2d at 486. 
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adopting the springing statute of limitations for actions when 
attorneys assume an obligation to safeguard a client’s long-term 
interests would not be so novel that it is impractical.209 
B. Steps to Implementation 
Public policy, precedence from the evolution of the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations, and the experiences of other states 
strongly indicate that the discovery rule is the fairest rule to apply for 
legal malpractice. However, the courts should not judicially adopt the 
rule.210 A legislatively adopted statute of limitations eliminates 
confusing and, at times, contradictory case law.211 The medical 
malpractice statute of limitations slowly evolved from the occurrence 
rule to the discovery rule through a series of constitutional challenges 
based on equal protection.212 Ultimately though, the legislature 
codified the common law because “prescribing periods of limitation 
is a legislative, not a judicial, function.”213 
Even in light of its potential for abuse, Georgia’s political 
environment is not ripe for a change to the legal malpractice statute 
of limitations. Various tort reform measures over the years have 
made it increasingly difficult to bring professional liability actions.214 
One of many examples of legislation the General Assembly has 
adopted to make most negligence actions more difficult is the 
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requirement that plaintiffs file an affidavit from an expert explaining 
how the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of care.215 
Statutes of limitations rarely receive the kind of attention that 
would compel legislative action. Public outcry can be a powerful way 
to induce decisive legislative action.216 Most cases that would 
generate attention in the media and the kind of outcry that lead to 
positive change settle prior to issuance of a judicial opinion.217 
Lawyers, probably more than any other professionals, know the 
inherent value in certainty and confidentiality, especially when their 
professional reputation is on the line.218 Cases with bad facts for 
defendant attorneys generally settle quickly and quietly. 
The “perfect case” to effect positive change may not come 
along.219 That is not an inherently bad thing for the profession 
because, overall, public attention on attorney malfeasance does more 
harm than good to the profession.220 However, the lack of publicity 
on an uncertain and important issue imposes a greater burden on the 
profession to be self-regulating.221 If and when the “perfect case” 
comes along and generates negative publicity on attorney 
malfeasance, and procedures are not in place to ensure that the 
victims of that malfeasance are protected in a fair manner, the public 
outcry will be directed against the profession for what the public will 
perceive as self-serving “technicalities” designed to keep suits 
against lawyers out of court.222 If that is how the public perceives the 
“perfect case” to effect legislative change on the legal malpractice 
statute of limitations, the results will likely not be satisfying for the 
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profession. It is better for the profession to be the drivers of change 
based on an analysis of all available facts and the experiences of the 
other states. 
Although Georgia, like many states, is hesitant to “open the 
floodgates of litigation,” legal malpractice actions are exceptional. 
Attorneys have an ethical duty to protect their clients’ interests.223 
Unlike medical malpractice, legal malpractice does not have the 
potential to end lives, but the consequences of legal malpractice are 
often life-altering for plaintiff-clients, and the legislature and the 
profession should protect them accordingly.224 The State Bar of 
Georgia should continue to use its influence with the legislature to 
push for any legislative clarity to legal malpractice and other 
professional liability statutes of limitations, even if that clarity does 
not directly lead to implementing the discovery rule. It must discuss 
the strengths and weaknesses of Georgia’s current state and analyze 
how other states confront those strengths and weaknesses. It must 
make and propose changes to the legislature to make sure procedural 
safeguards are in place that clearly advance the policy concerns of all 
interested parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The occurrence rule is ill-suited to protect wronged clients who 
have a cause of action for legal malpractice. Georgia’s rigid 
adherence to the strict rule results in good cases getting thrown out 
with bad ones, because clients often do not even know that they have 
a cause of action before the statute of limitations runs.225 Forty-eight 
states have recognized the pitfalls of the occurrence rule and adapted 
or replaced it.226 Georgia should follow their lead and adopt the 
discovery rule. The discovery rule does precisely what an effective 
statute of limitations is supposed to do: ensure that a cause of action 
does not have an unlimited life span while protecting the rights and 
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interests of the plaintiff.227 One case like Willis v. Maverick should be 
enough to embarrass the profession and force quick changes.228 It is 
in the best interest of the legal profession to advocate for adaptation 
of the discovery rule to protect the clients that the profession serves 
and the integrity of the profession itself. 
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